Material Limits Adjusted by a Modified Airborne Release Fraction by Sandvig, Michael Dennis
INEEL/CON-2000-00099
PREPRINT
Material Limits Adjusted by a Modified Airborne
Release Fraction
M. D. Sandvig
April 28, 2000 – May 4, 2000
Safety Analysis Working Group Workshop 2000
This is a preprint of a paper intended for publication in
journal or proceedings. Since changes may be
before publication, this preprint should not be cited
reproduced without permission  of the author.
This document was prepared as a account of
sponsored by an agency of the United States
Neither the United States Government nor any
thereof, or any of their employees, makes any
expressed or impli ed, or assumes any legal liability or
responsibility for any third party's use, or the results
such use, of any information, apparatus, product
process disclosed in this report, or represents that
use by such third party would not infringe privately
owned rights. The views expressed in this paper
not necessarily those of the U.S. Government or
sponsoring agency.
BECHTEL BWXT IDAHO, LLC
1Paper Title: Material Limits Adjusted by a Modified Airborne Release Fraction
Author: Michael D. Sandvig, sandvimd@inel.gov, (208) 526-6140
Work performed under a Department of Energy contract, number DE-AC07-99ID-13727.
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory - Bechtel BWXT Idaho, LLC
P.O. Box 1625
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415-0313
This paper will discuss the methods used at a depleted uranium facility to develop a hazard
categorization and a limiting condition for operation (LCO) for the inventory based on increased
Category 2 threshold quantity values (TV) from DOE Standard 1027-92.  A revision to the safety
analysis report (SAR) for a Category 3 depleted uranium facility was required to meet current
methodologies and isotope content.  The previous SAR first approved in 1992, allowed an
inventory of depleted uranium that exceeded the Category 2 threshold quantity values in the
material storage warehouses using an accident analysis methodology for final hazard
categorization.  New information regarding the isotopic content of the depleted uranium required
an updated hazard categorization evaluation.  The DOE Standard 1027-92 requires the evaluation
to be based on inventory (Reference 1, 3.1, page 5), therefore, the previous method of performing
a hazard consequence and probability analysis could not be used.  The standard (1027) requires a
facility to be designated as a Category 3 Nuclear facility when the inventory levels in the facility,
or facility segments, are greater than Category 3 thresholds and below Category 2 thresholds.  A
Category 2 Nuclear Facility requires a more in depth hazard and accident analysis.  Our
categorization was based on an inventory, adjusted by a form and containerization analysis.
The process we used started with an evaluation of the current operational requirements.  This
included a review of the current depleted uranium inventory, both in storage and in the
manufacturing process.  The existing hazard analysis was also reviewed.  The hazard analysis
also required modification due to the elimination of chemical processes.  Although changes were
required, the existing hazard analysis could be used in the new hazard categorization. The
standard states that the final categorization is based on an “unmitigated release” of available
hazardous material. For the purposes of hazard categorization, “unmitigated” is meant to consider
material quantity, form, location, dispersibility and interaction with available energy sources, but
not to consider safety features (e.g., ventilation system, fire suppression, etc.) which are designed
to prevent or mitigate a release.  (Ref. 1, 3.1.2, pg. 5)  Our inventory was compared against the
threshold quantity values identified in Attachment 1 of DOE Standard 1027.  A sum-of-the-
fractions method was used to define the Category 2 threshold quantity value.  Uranium is best
measured by its mass.  This is because of its very low specific activity.  A curie of depleted
uranium weighs about three tons.  So we evaluate the sum of the fractions using mass instead of
activity as follows.
Σ Mn/TVn  < 1 (Ref. 1, A-2)
The isotopes contained in our depleted uranium include uranium (U)-238, U-235, U-234, U-236,
and traces of transuranics and technicium-99.  The mass fraction of each of the isotopic
constituents of depleted uranium are reasonably constant, therefore, they may be expressed as a
fraction of the whole mass.  The expression would be modified to the following.
Σ Mdufn/TVn  < 1
This equation is then set to equal to one and solved for the mass of depleted uranium.  The basic
threshold quantity value was determined to be 1.39 million pounds of depleted uranium.  This can
2be compared to the threshold quantity value for U-238 of 1.56 million pounds.  Three facility
segments were determined to have operational needs greater than that value.  One segment, a
warehouse, had a current inventory of nearly twice that value.
The standard specifies the airborne release fraction (ARF) that is the basis of the threshold
quantity values.  The ARF is the fraction of the material that will be respirable (not greater than
10 µm in diameter).  The threshold quantity value is derived using the following equation.  (Ref.
1, A-6.)
TV = (1 rem)/(ARF*SA*X/Q*(CEDE*RR + CSDE))
The threshold quantity value may be modified if the credible ARF can be shown to be
significantly different.  The new threshold quantity value (TVnew) is determined by dividing the
“default” threshold quantity value (TV1027) (Ref. 1, Table A.1) by the ratio of the maximum
potential ARF (ARFHC) to the default ARF (ARF1027) (pg. A-9).  (Ref. 1, pg. 5)
TVnew = TV1027/ (ARFHC/ARF1027) (Ref. 3, pg. II-1)
TVnew = (TV1027 x ARF1027)/ ARFHC Simplified
Further analysis on form, interaction with available energy sources and dispersibility was
performed to obtain the project specific data needed to justify a modified ARF.  This analysis was
substantially contained in the existing SAR.  The use of a technically justified decreased ARF
provides for a technically valid method of maintaining a Category 3 designation even though the
facility inventory exceeds the unmodified Category 2 threshold.  The default ARF for the
constituents of depleted uranium is 0.001 (1 E-3) for solids, powders and liquids regardless of
form or containerization. That ARF, if used without regard for material form and
containerization, would significantly overstate the postulated releases.  The basis for the ARF is
from NUREG-1140 (Reference 2).  This reference noted that worst case analysis and experiments
were used. The report contains an analysis of three uranium metal accidents.  One relevant case
was a fire involving uranium metal turnings.  The analysis assumed all of the material was
oxidized.  The ARF was estimated to be 0.001  A fire is the most likely release scenario for our
project.
 The DOE ID Notice 420.A1, “Safety Basis Review and Approval Process,” (Reference 3)
provides guidance on how the ARF may be modified based on factors such as form in arriving at
a facility's final hazard category.  The primary relevant factors are how combustible or dispersible
the material is.  Depleted uranium metal is considered a combustible metal, especially in the form
of unoxidized turnings and fines.  However, research has shown that in bulk form the material is
essentially non-combustible.  If the larger pieces do not burn, or do not burn completely, then the
ARF is significantly reduced.  The key variable is the specific surface area (SA), which relates
material dimension to bulk weight in square-centimeters per gram.  Depleted uranium metal with
low specific surface area does not tend to burn and release small particles as readily as do
turnings and fines. (Reference 4)  The following table shows that characteristic.
3 Time (minutes) to Completely Oxidize DU Material
Temperature 805 oC 995 oC 1200 oC 1440 oC
Specific Area
(minutes) (minutes) (minutes) (minutes)
Sa = 0.015 4690 4657 2007 996
Sa = 0.3 194 161 69 34
Sa = 0.4 135 101 43 21
Sa = 0.5 99 66 28 13
Sa = 0.6 75 42 18 8
Sa = 0.7 58 25 11 5
Wood and diesel oil is the combustible material likely to support fires at our facility.  Wood and
diesel fires develop temperatures of 1000 to 1100 oC.  The available fuel source is not likely to
burn significantly for more than an hour or two on its own.  Therefore, it can be readily seen that
these fires are not likely to consume the depleted uranium with a small specific area.  Therefore,
the amount of material that can be released as respirable particles is significantly decreased.
The following table contains currently accepted airborne release fractions developed by a DOE
working group. It is contained in ID Notice 420.A1.  The notice permits these ARFs to be
employed without further approval by DOE-ID.
Alternate Airborne Release Fractions for Hazard Categorization
Material Form ARFHC
Contaminated combustible materials:
     In generic metal containers or drums
     In WIPP-certified metal containers or drums (or fitted with a filter)
     Non-metal or degraded/damaged metal containers
5 E-4
1 E-4
1 E-3
Contaminated non-combustible solids/powders/liquids in sound closed metal
containers or drums.
5 E-5
Fixed matrix forms in sound and closed metal containers or drums (e.g. concrete,
vitrified material, etc.)
1 E-6
Widely dispersed, low-level contamination attached to inert material (e.g.
contaminated soil, surface contamination, etc.)
5 E-6
From this information it was determined that an alternate ARF of 5 E-4 could be used for
materials with a SA of < 0.3, (a factor of 2 decrease) and 1 E-4 for a SA of 0.015 (a factor of 10
decrease).  The DOE ID Notice also provided for an additional factor of 2 decrease in the ARF
when packaging material in sound closed metal containers.  We applied this reduction to depleted
uranium with a SA <0.7.  These values were selected because they met operational needs and they
are conservative.  The decreased ARF for a particular material form and packaging results in an
inversely proportional increase in the Category 2 threshold quantity value used for that
component of the total inventory.
4The facility has significant quantities of material in six combinations of SA and packaging.
Material limits were developed for each of these combinations for operational flexibility and to
assure the facility operations were maintained within the authorization basis.  The following table
displays the various forms of depleted uranium, the packaging, ARFs and the associated
thresholds.
Material At Risk Inventory Limits
Material SA ARFHC  Factor Modified
Threshold
(ATV)
(pounds)
Turnings and  Fines                  (T) >1 1 E-3 1.0 1.39E6
Processed Material in Wood    (Pw) 0.3 - 0.7 1E-3 1.0 1.39E6
Processed Material in Metal     (Pm) 0.3 - 0.7 5 E-4 2.0 2.78E6
Product in Wood                      (Aw) <0.3 5 E-4 2.0 2.78E6
Product in Metal                       (Am) <0.3 2.5 E-4 4.0 5.56E6
Billets in Wood                         (Bw) 0.015 1 E-4 10.0 13.9E6
Billets in Metal                         (Bm) 0.015 5 E-5 20.0 27.8E6
Miscellaneous Sources             (Sm) Default Default 1.0 STD1027
Each facility segment could have a combination of material forms and packaging.  The single
material threshold could be used except for those segments that approached 1.39 million pounds.
For those cases, the “sum-of-the-fractions” methodology was established to assure the facility
would maintain an inventory in each facility segment less than the Category 2 threshold quantity
value.  This methodology involves dividing the weight (in pounds) of the material, accounting for
form and container, by its threshold.  This process is repeated for each material form and
container type.  The sum must be maintained less than 1.
                             1 > [(T /ATVT) + (Pw/ATVPw) + (Pm/ATVPm) + (Aw/ATVAw) + (Am/ATVAm) + (Bw/ATVBw) + ( Bm/ATVBm)] + [Σ Sm(i)/TVm(i)]
This formula was established as a LCO.  The warehouses have developed a “checkbook” type
transaction system for changes to the inventory.  Transactions in and out of the facility are
recorded accounting for mass, form and packaging.   The warehouse workers are trained to
perform “what-if” evaluations for the transactions.  The level of rigor in the evaluations is graded
based on the how much the current inventory and transaction challenges the limit.  For example,
if the facility segment is at 50% of the limit, then 695,000 pounds of depleted uranium in any
form could be added.  Assume the plan of the day calls for adding 150,000 pounds of billets to
the inventory and shipping out of inventory 50,000 pounds of recycle scrap.  This example does
not require a detailed evaluation as the changes do not challenge the limits.  However, if the
facility is at 90% of the limit then only 139,000 pounds of depleted uranium in any form can be
added.  If the personnel desire to add the same 150,000 pounds of billets, then a calculation must
be made.  In this case, 1.39 million pounds of depleted uranium billets equal 10% of the limit (for
billets), so the transaction can be authorized.  However, because the facility segment is
approaching the limit, each transaction must be tracked nearly real-time or before each action.
For added assurance, procedures were established that required manager approval for transactions
involving an inventory greater than 80% of the limit.  In either case, a daily accounting is
expected.
To summarize, the analysis and methodology described above was incorporated in a revision to
the SAR.  It replaced the previous hazard analysis method approved in the early 1990’s.  It clearly
shows that unmitigated releases would not have an impact greater than those allowed for
5Category 3 facilities.  A material Limiting Condition for Operation was developed and
implemented as described above.  Administrative controls were established to assure compliance.
Personnel were trained in the method of evaluating the current fraction of the limit and to perform
“what-if” calculations for proposed additions.  The resulting LCO did not impact the current
operational needs of the facility.
Other Category 3 facilities, or proposed Category 3 facilities, could benefit from this
methodology to appropriately categorize their facilities using the material inventory, form and
containerization.  This methodology is complementary to facility segmentation to determine
material at risk.
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